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Abstract 
 
This article reviews the scholarship on semi-presidentialism since the early 1990s. 
We identify three waves of semi-presidential studies. The first wave focused on 
the concept of semi-presidentialism, how it should be defined, and what 
countries should be classified as semi-presidential. The second wave examined 
the effect of semi-presidential institutions on newly democratized countries. 
Does semi-presidentialism help or hinder the process of democratic 
consolidation? The third wave examines the effect of semi-presidential 
institutions on both recent and consolidated democracies.  Third-wave studies 
have been characterized by three questions: to what extent does the direct 
election of the president make a difference to outcomes; to what extent does 
variation in presidential power make a difference; and what other factors interact 
with presidential power to help to bring about differential outcomes? The article 
argues that the concept of semi-presidentialism remains taxonomically valid, but 
that the empirical scholarship on countries with semi-presidential institutions 
needs to respond to broader developments within the discipline if it is to remain 
relevant. 
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In the 1990s, the long-running debate about presidential and parliamentary 
government was given new urgency and focus following the collapse of 
communism. This debate was also marked by the beginning of a new era of work 
on semi-presidentialism. This article reviews the scholarship on semi-
presidentialism since this time. We identify three waves of semi-presidential 
studies. Without implying that work consistent with one wave had to end before 
another could start, we show that the first wave focused on the concept of semi-
presidentialism, how it should be defined, and what countries should be 
classified as semi-presidential. The second wave examined the effect of semi-
presidential institutions on newly democratized countries. Does semi-
presidentialism help or hinder the process of democratic consolidation? The third 
wave examines the effect of semi-presidential institutions on both recent and 
consolidated democracies, focusing on issues such as government formation and 
termination. In addition to providing an overview of the three waves of semi-
presidential studies, the article also identifies three challenges to the 
contemporary scholarship on semi-presidentialism. The first reflects the shift 
from the study of semi-presidentialism to the effects of presidential power; the 
second concerns a more general skepticism regarding the importance ascribed to 
formal elite-level political institutions on the process of democratization; the 
third is derived from concerns about how best to study of the causal effects of 
institutions generally. Having discussed these challenges, the article concludes 
by arguing that the concept of semi-presidentialism remains taxonomically valid, 
but that the empirical scholarship on countries with semi-presidential 
institutions needs to respond to broader developments within the discipline if it 
is to remain relevant. 
 
THE FIRST WAVE: DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
 
The concept of ‘semi-presidentialism’ was introduced in the 11th edition of 
Maurice Duverger’s textbook on political systems in 1970. Here, he identified a 
set of ‘semi-presidential regimes’, including France, Austria, Finland and the 
defunct regime in Weimar Germany. 1  Over the course of the next decade, 
Duverger refined his definition and extended his examples to include Iceland, 
Ireland and Portugal. This work culminated in his book, Échec au Roi,2 which was 
summarized in an English-language article in the European Journal of Political 
Research in 1980.3 The definition that was formulated by Duverger in 1970 and 
that was then popularized in 1980 generated a debate about how the concept of 
semi-presidentialism should be defined and, by extension, which countries 
should be classed as semi-presidential. 
  Duverger defined a political regime as semi-presidential: 
if the constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) 
the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, 
however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive 
and governmental power and can stay in office only if the 
parliament does not show its opposition to them.4 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Duverger was the only person to have provided a 
formal definition of the concept.  
In the early 1990s, though, Duverger’s definition was challenged. For 
example, O’Neil argued that a country could be classed as semi-presidential even 
if the president was not directly elected, so long as the institution was fairly 
powerful.5 However, this interpretation was not widely adopted. By contrast, 
Sartori preferred to reformulate Duverger’s definition entirely. 6  Even though 
Sartori’s work was widely cited, again this interpretation of semi-presidentialism 
was not widely adopted. In short, throughout the 1990s Duverger’s definition 
remained standard. 
 This position was challenged at the end of the decade. Elgie argued that 
problem with Duverger’s definition was that it rested on an essentially 
ambiguous clause.7 For Duverger, one of the defining elements of the concept 
was that the president had to possess “quite considerable powers”. However, 
what one writer believed to be quite considerable differed from what another 
scholar believed it to be. The ambiguity of this clause raised two issues. First, the 
list of semi-presidential countries varied from one person to the next. Country 
experts would claim that their country was or was not semi-presidential because 
they considered their president to have either too few or too many powers than 
could rightly be counted as “quite considerable”. Second, and more importantly, 
it generated an endogeneity problem in cross-national comparative research. 
Often, scholars classed as semi-presidential only those countries where the 
president was observed to exercise quite considerable powers. They then looked 
at political practice in these countries and found that semi-presidentialism was 
problematic because the president had quite considerable powers that generated 
tension within the executive. They then concluded that semi-presidentialism was 
problematic because it created tension within the executive. The logic of such an 
argument was inescapably circular.8 
The solution to this problem was to remove any reference to the powers of 
the president from the definition of the concept. Thus, Elgie proposed the 
following definition: 
Semi-presidentialism is the situation where a constitution makes 
provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a 
prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the 
legislature.9 
The advantage of this definition was that it allowed countries to be classed as 
semi-presidential on the basis of publicly available documents rather than 
essentially contestable local knowledge. This meant that the list of countries with 
semi-presidential constitutions could be agreed. It also allowed countries to be 
classified as semi-presidential without reference to any behavioral condition, 
meaning that the endogeneity problem could be avoided.10 
According to Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, this definition of semi-
presidentialism has now been adopted by “the majority” of scholars, effectively 
replacing Duverger’s definition of the concept11 This is now the standard way of 
defining the term and is used by almost all leading comparativists, such as 
Samuels and Shugart.12 That said, like any social science concept, it remains open 
to challenge. Magni-Berton has recently provided an alternative way of 
identifying semi-presidential countries.13 What is more, some country experts are 
still exercised by the thought of their country being classed as semi-presidential 
and revert back to a Duvergerian understanding of the term. For example, Clark 
has explicitly rejected the classification of Russia as semi-presidential because the 
president there is too strong. 14  Likewise, Munkh-Erdene has argued that 
Mongolia should be classified as parliamentary, because the president there has 
too few powers.15 While Duverger’s influence will always be strong and while 
country experts will always challenge the application of the term to their 
particular case, there is now much less debate about how to define the concept of 
semi-presidentialism than there used to be. More than that, among 
comparativists there is very little disagreement as to the list of semi-presidential 
countries. In this way, we can reasonably conclude that this element of 
controversy in the first wave of semi-presidential studies is now all but resolved. 
There is a standard definition of semi-presidentialism and a relatively consensual 
list of semi-presidential countries. 
There is, though, a second definitional controversy. Even the briefest of 
glances at the list of countries with semi-presidential constitutions based on the 
now standard post-Duvergerian definition reveals that it includes some countries 
with very strong presidents (e.g. Russia), some with very weak presidents (e.g. 
Slovenia), and some where the president has relatively strong but still limited 
powers (e.g. Romania). While comparativists are generally willing to classify all 
such countries as semi-presidential, this variation poses a problem for 
comparative empirical analysis. There is little to be gained from operationalizing 
semi-presidentialism as an explanatory variable when there is such extreme 
variation within the set of semi-presidential countries. Therefore, even if the 
post-Duvergerian definition captures a form of constitutional government that is 
essentially different from presidentialism and parliamentarism, when scholars 
wish to explore the empirical effects of semi-presidentialism they are obliged to 
find a way of operationalizing the variation within the set of semi-presidential 
countries. Thus, work in the first wave of semi-presidentialism has generated a 
two-step logic. The first step is a process of taxonomic classification based on the 
interpretation of certain constitutional rules – is the president directly elected 
and are the prime minister and cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature? 
This process allows countries with semi-presidential constitutions to be 
distinguished from those with presidential and parliamentary constitutions, but 
it reveals nothing about the actual distribution of presidential power. The second 
step is a further process of classification that aims to generate some basic 
distinctions within the set of semi-presidential countries in a way that captures 
variation in actual presidential power. In the second stage of this process, there is 
an ongoing debate about how best to capture such variation. Here, there are 
three basic options. 
The first option is to fall back on descriptive terms. For example, Elgie 
distinguishes between highly presidentialized semi-presidential countries, semi-
presidential countries with ceremonial presidents and strong prime ministers, 
and semi-presidential countries with a balance of executive power.16 Tsai and Wu 
have proposed similar typologies. 17  This option is problematic, because it 
reintroduces the inherent ambiguity present in Duverger’s original formulation 
of the concept. For example, what counts as a highly presidentialized system will 
differ from one person to another. Thus, most comparativists have rejected this 
option. The second option is to avoid definitional debates altogether and simply 
use a metric of presidential power. There are now many measures that generate 
such metrics. They include Metcalf, Shugart and Carey, and Siaroff.18  These 
measures provide scores for the extent of presidential power across a range of 
countries. The effect of variation in presidential power can then be empirically 
tested. The scores are usually generated from the coding of country constitutions. 
The main advantage of these measures is that, in theory, they are replicable. 
There are two main disadvantages. The first is that constitutional powers often 
differ from actual powers, meaning that the scores for specific countries can be 
misleading. For example, Iceland often scores highly for presidential power, 
whereas the president is mainly a figurehead. By the same token, the French 
president often generates a low score, even though presidents there have often 
been very powerful.19 The second is that the measures themselves are often 
capturing different dimensions of presidential power and lack validity for that 
reason.20 Rather than trying to measure presidential power, the third option is to 
distinguish between semi-presidential countries on the basis of a further 
constitutional rule. Here, Shugart and Carey’s distinction between president-
parliamentary and premier-presidential forms of semi-presidentialism has 
become dominant. 21  For Shugart, “Under premier-presidentialism, the prime 
minister and cabinet are exclusively accountable to the assembly majority, while 
under president-parliamentarism, the prime minister and cabinet are dually 
accountable to the president and the assembly majority”.22 Broadly speaking, 
president-parliamentary countries have stronger presidents than premier-
presidential countries. The advantage of this option is that, like the now standard 
definition of semi-presidentialism itself, the distinction between the two sub-
types of semi-presidentialism can be based on a publicly available constitutional 
rule that requires no specialist country knowledge. The disadvantage is that, as 
with measures of presidential power, constitutional divisions of power 
sometimes do not neatly match actual divisions. Generally, the second and third 
ways of distinguishing between semi-presidential countries are used, but there 
are problems with both. 
The first wave of semi-presidential studies generated a considerable 
amount of work and some often heated debates. The debate about the definition 
of semi-presidentialism itself has now been resolved at least to the satisfaction of 
most comparativists, though even among this set of scholars there is an ongoing 
debate about the best way to distinguish between countries with semi-
presidential constitutions in terms of presidential power. However, this shift of 
emphasis raises its own question. If the concept of semi-presidentialism is of 
purely taxonomic interest, then is it redundant? Given concepts are fundamental 
to the scientific enterprise and they are particularly important in the social 
sciences, the answer is fundamentally no. The post-Duvergerian definition of 
semi-presidentialism provides the basis for a more reliable taxonomy of regime 
types than Duverger’s original definition. Therefore, if the aim is to identify the 
institutional differences between semi-presidentialism, presidentialism, and 
parliamentarism at a conceptual level, then only the post-Duvergerian definition 
of semi-presidentialism will do in this regard. However, if the aim is to capture 
the effect of institutional differences between countries in empirical terms, then 
operationalizing semi-presidentialism as a discrete explanatory variable will not 
do at all. At the very least, Shugart and Carey’s distinction between premier-
presidentialism and president-parliamentarism can serve as the basis for 
potentially valid conclusions about the effect of the variation in presidential 
power within semi-presidentialism. Perhaps better still, a more fine-grained 
measure of presidential power should be used. There are after all, differences in 
presidential power across the set of presidential countries as well as semi-
presidential ones and, indeed, there are differences in presidential power in 
parliamentary republics, as Tavits has clearly shown. 23  Thus, semi-
presidentialism remains part of the arsenal of political concepts at political 
scientists’ disposal, but empirically it should be operationalized very carefully 
with a focus on the effect of variation in presidential power. We now turn to 
empirical studies of semi-presidentialism since the early 1990s.  
 
THE SECOND WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
The debate about the definition of semi-presidentialism and the classification of 
countries as semi-presidential was important because in the 1990s there was a 
rapid increase in the number of countries with a semi-presidential constitution. 
By itself, this increase was enough to generate a certain academic interest, but the 
distribution of semi-presidential countries also changed, encouraging a 
particular research agenda. Rather than being mainly confined to rich, 
consolidated, European democracies, semi-presidentialism was introduced in 
many newly democratic countries, including newly established countries in the 
former USSR and the former Yugoslavia. Given this distribution, scholars 
focused overwhelmingly on the impact of semi-presidentialism on 
democratization. This generated a second wave of semi-presidential studies that 
began in the early 1990s. 
 In retrospect, Shugart and Carey’s volume Presidents and Assemblies was 
the first second-wave study. 24  They countered the general criticism of 
presidentialism by arguing that countries with directly elected presidents were 
not necessarily harmful to democracy if presidential institutions were crafted 
carefully. As part of this argument, they pointed to the potential benefits of 
premier-presidentialism in contrast to president-parliamentarism, which they 
classed among the potentially dangerous institutional configurations. They relied 
on only anecdotal evidence, but their volume was extremely influential. At the 
time, Shugart and Carey rejected the label of semi-presidentialism. Instead, they 
stated that “what Duverger refers to as semi-presidential, we designate premier-
presidential”. 25  They also made it clear that president-parliamentarism was 
separate from premier-presidentialism, implying that it was not a form of semi-
presidentialism either.26 The result was that even though Shugart and Carey were 
sympathetic to premier-presidentialism as a form of constitutional design for 
new democracies, their argument was rarely interpreted as an argument in 
favour of either semi-presidentialism or a particular form of semi-presidentialism. 
Only later did Shugart explicitly and systematically classify both premier-
presidentialism and president-parliamentarism as sub-types of semi-
presidentialism.27 Indeed, this is now the standard way in which Shugart presents 
these concepts.28 
 With Shugart and Carey explicitly rejecting the semi-presidential label, 
there appeared to be very few proponents of semi-presidentialism in the mid-
1990s. For example, in 1994 Linz published a long essay that reiterated his 
arguments about the perils of presidentialism 29  and the virtues of 
parliamentarism30 and that also included a discussion of semi-presidentialism.31 
Again based on anecdotal evidence, Linz was willing to concede that some forms 
of semi-presidentialism might be conducive to democratization, notably where 
the directly elected president was a figurehead and where the system functioned 
like a parliamentary system. In general, though, he expressed his opposition to 
French-style semi-presidentialism where the president had quite considerable 
powers, which was how the concept was generally understood at the time, given, 
as we have seen, Duverger’s definition was still dominant. This argument was 
reiterated in Linz and Stepan’s comparative volume.32 Again based on largely 
anecdotal, qualitative country studies, they pointed to the particular problems of 
cohabitation within semi-presidentialism. This is the situation where the 
president and prime minister are from opposing parties or coalitions and the 
president’s party or coalition is not represented in the government. Pointing to 
Poland as an example, they argued that this situation created the potential for 
power struggles within the executive that were liable to threaten fragile new 
democracies. With Shugart and Carey’s work not being interpreted as an 
argument in favour of semi-presidentialism or at least one type of semi-
presidentialism, Linz’s negative judgment about the effect of semi-
presidentialism on democratization came to dominate thinking in this regard. 
Among scholars and constitution-builders, the clear recommendation was that 
semi-presidentialism should be avoided. 
 This position was challenged by Giovanni Sartori.33 He addressed the issue 
of cohabitation. Whereas Linz emphasized the likelihood of conflict within the 
executive when the majority in the legislature was opposed to the president, 
Sartori pointed to the French case and noted that cohabitation caused power to 
shift to the prime minister, leaving the president a figurehead. This ‘head-
shifting’, he suggested, was a source of institutional flexibility, leading him to 
suggest that cohabitation could lead to a ‘rebalancing’ within the executive.34 On 
the basis of this argument, Sartori has come be seen as one of the first people to 
support semi-presidentialism. However, two points need to be stressed. The first 
is that Sartori’s support for semi-presidentialism was equivocal. Certainly, he 
preferred it to presidentialism, but he refused to choose between semi-
presidentialism and parliamentarism as his preferred form of government.35 More 
than that, Sartori also noted that there were potential problems with a French-
style dual authority structure. 36  So, even though Sartori’s book was very 
influential, it did little to change the generally negative judgment about semi-
presidentialism. For the most part, scholars were still reluctant to recommend it 
as a constitutional choice for new democracies. The second point is that, like both 
Shugart and Carey and Linz before him, Sartori’s argument about semi-
presidentialism was based almost entirely on anecdotal examples from 
consolidated democracies. There may have been little option at the time of 
writing, because the experience of semi-presidentialism in young democracies 
was so new. All the same, it did point to limitations in the empirical work on this 
topic at this time. 
 The key development in the second wave of semi-presidential studies can 
be traced back to Roper’s article in Comparative Politics. 37 This article explicitly 
identified premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism as two forms 
of semi-presidentialism, meaning that work by scholars of semi-presidentialism 
was now consistent with the work of Shugart and Carey. This article also 
stressed the importance of institutional variation not just within semi-
presidentialism, but within premier-presidentialism too. To do so, Roper 
measured the power of presidents in a number of premier-presidential countries 
using a variation of Shugart and Carey’s index of presidential power. 38 This was 
important because it changed the terms of the debate that had been dominated 
by Linz and Sartori. They gave the impression that the effects of semi-
presidentialism were unidirectional, whereas Roper stressed that variation 
within semi-presidentialism was likely to be associated with variation in 
outcomes. This is the equivalent of the two-step process that we saw in terms of 
the debate about the definition and classification of semi-presidential systems in 
the previous section. Importantly, Roper also applied his argument to a mix of 
young and old democracies in Europe. In this way, he did more than just 
extrapolate from the experience of consolidated democracies. From this point on 
the research agenda for the second wave of semi-presidential studies was set. 
The aim was to explain the extent to which semi-presidential institutions affected 
the success or failure of new democracies; this question was approached from the 
principle that there was variation in presidential power within semi-
presidentialism; and empirically tests of the effect of such variation needed to 
include consideration of new democracies. 
With the research agenda set in this way, the more recent work in the 
second wave of semi-presidential studies has been characterized by two 
developments. First, whereas previous work on semi-presidentialism and 
democratization in new democracies tended to draw conclusions on the basis of 
anecdotal evidence from single-country or small-n studies, now there has been a 
shift to medium- and large-n comparison. So, Moestrup presented the first 
statistical test of the performance of presidential, parliamentary and semi-
presidential countries, distinguishing between the effect of premier-presidential 
and president-parliamentary forms of semi-presidentialism.39 Since then, large-n 
studies testing the effect of semi-presidentialism and/or variation within semi-
presidentialsim have been undertaken by various writers.40  We should note, 
though, that some studies still operationalize a ‘mixed’ regime type variable, 
which we can understand to correspond to semi-presidentialism but which does 
not take account of any variation within this regime type.41 Second, whereas 
before the research question was couched primarily in terms of which one of 
presidentialism, parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism was most conducive to 
the success of new democracies, now this question has been asked in terms 
which form of semi-presidentialism is most conducive to this end. So, Elgie and 
Elgie and Schleiter have focused solely on the effects of institutional variation 
within semi-presidentialism, finding evidence that premier-presidentialism is 
more conducive to democratization than president-parliamentarism. 42  These 
studies do not aim to draw any conclusions about the performance of semi-
presidentialism relative to other regime types, but they do wish to draw 
conclusions about the performance of semi-presidential countries relative to each 
other. 
In general, the shift from anecdotal accounts of consolidated democracies 
to much more rigorous large-n comparative studies of new democracies has 
improved our chances of drawing general conclusions about the average effect of 
institutional variation on democratization. Even so, despite the apparent increase 
in scientific rigour, we still cannot be sure about the effects of semi-
presidentialism and variation within it relative to the effects of presidential and 
parliamentary institutions. For example, Moestrup finds that parliamentary 
systems perform significantly better than semi-presidential system and that there 
is no significant difference between semi-presidentialism and presidentialism.43 
By contrast, Hiroi and Omori argue that the parliamentarism performs worse 
than presidentialism, though there is some evidence that semi-presidentialism 
performs better than presidentialism.44 For their part, Cheibub and Chernykh 
conclude that semi-presidentialism has no significant effect relative to other 
regime types.45 The studies by Maeda and Svolik can be interpreted as coming to 
a similar conclusion.46 In short, when we focus solely on more recent second-
wave studies, it would be perilous to drawn any definitive conclusions about the 
general effect of semi-presidentialism and variation within it relative to 
presidentialism and parliamentarism. Results are very sensitive to the time 
period of the study, the countries included, how democracy and the collapse of 
democracy are defined, the variables included in the estimations, the proxies 
used for the concepts being captured by those variables, what estimation 
technique is used, and so on. So, notwithstanding the inherent lack of validity in 
conclusions that some scholars still wish to draw about the effect of semi-
presidentialism in general on democratization, we should maintain a healthy 
degree of skepticism about any conclusions concerning the impact of variation 
within semi-presidentialism as well the effect of such variation relative to 
presidentialism and parliamentarism. In short, we still cannot be sure about the 
causal effect of particular institutions.  
This conclusion generates two further challenges for the study of semi-
presidentialism. The first concerns the focus of inquiry. Partly because robust 
conclusions about the effect of institutions on democratization have been difficult 
to identify, some scholars are now privileging bottom-up, society-centred 
research rather than top-down institutional accounts.47 For example, rather than 
analyzing the effect of formal institutions, scholars are increasingly examining 
the impact of informal institutions and non-institutional factors. As a result, the 
study of semi-presidentialism risks being crowded out of the research agenda. 
The second challenge concerns the method of inquiry. Positivist political science 
has been hit by the identificationist revolution.48 Concerns about how to identify 
causal relationships have posed general problems for political analysis, 
particularly the study of institutions. One response has been to focus on 
experimental methods. Yet elite-level institutions are difficult to study in this 
way, not least because of fundamental issues regarding the absence of 
randomized assignment. Consequently, there is the real risk that academic 
attention will shift to topics that are easier to study in the lab or in the field, such 
as studies of voting behavior and ideology, and away from institutions, such as 
presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. 
The study of semi-presidentialism needs to respond to both of these 
challenges. To this end, there is still room for essentially qualitative, single-
country or small-n studies of the effect of elite-level institutions on 
democratization. However, such studies need to be based on a rigorous research 
design. Lydia Beuman’s study of semi-presidentialism in Timor-Leste is an 
excellent example in this regard.49 Such studies also need to directly compare the 
effect of elite-level institutions relative to informal institutions and non-
institutional factors. In other words, qualitative-oriented scholars need to 
identify the relative importance of different explanatory factors and not merely 
assume that elite-level institutions are important by ignoring informal 
institutional and non-institutional factors or controlling them away through the 
judicious use of case selection. In addition, positivist-style scholars of semi-
presidentialism need to respond to the identificationist challenge. For example, 
there has been plenty of lab-based work on the effect of electoral systems. With a 
certain degree of imagination, the basic principles of this work could be applied 
to the study of the effects of presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-
presidentialism, including variation within semi-presidentialism. Overall, there 
have been profound developments in the study of semi-presidentialism and 
democratization since the early 1990s. In order to remain relevant, work in this 
area has to respond to broader developments in the discipline. Otherwise, there 
is the real prospect that work on semi-presidentialism and democratization will 
become marginalized and increasingly irrelevant. 
 
THE THIRD WAVE: PARTIES, POWER AND PARLIAMENTS 
 
The study of semi-presidentialism in consolidated democracies started at a very 
early stage. Writing well before the wave of democratization in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, Duverger was concerned with explaining why countries with the 
same basic constitutional structure operated in very different ways. Why was 
France so presidentialized, when in Austria, Iceland and Ireland the system 
operated in a parliamentary-like manner, even though the president was directly 
elected? To answer this question, he identified four factors: “the actual content of 
the constitution, the combination of tradition and circumstances, the composition 
of the parliamentary majority, and the position of the president in relation to this 
majority”.50 As we shall see, these factors remain central to the analysis of third-
wave semi-presidential studies. In one sense, this means is that what we are 
calling the third wave of semi-presidential studies actually predates the 
beginning of the second wave. In another sense, though, with attention initially 
focused on the issue of democratization, the systematic study of semi-
presidentialism in consolidated democracies was largely ignored throughout the 
1990s. Now, though, it has become the principal focus of attention. This is the 
sense in which we can identify it as the third wave of semi-presidential studies. 
In general, third-wave studies have been characterized by three questions: to 
what extent does the direct election of the president make a difference to 
outcomes; to what extent does variation in presidential power make a difference; 
and what other factors interact with presidential power to help to bring about 
differential outcomes? 
 Samuels and Shugart argue that the direct election of the president does 
make a difference.51 In particular, it affects party politics, which in turn has an 
impact of other aspects of the political process. They state: “to the extent that the 
constitutional structure separates executive and legislative origin and/or survival, parties 
will tend to be presidentialized” (emphasis in the original).52 Separate origin refers to 
the situation where there is a direct presidential election that is held separately 
from legislative elections, albeit perhaps simultaneously. Separate survival 
“means that a party or legislative majority cannot remove a sitting president”.53 
The separate origin of the executive and the legislature means that what it takes 
for the president to be elected is not necessarily what it takes for individual party 
deputies to be elected or for the party as a whole to gain a majority there. 
Presidential candidates are likely to adopt a vote-seeking strategy that 
emphasises public goods because they need to win a large proportion of the 
national electorate.54 By contrast, the party’s legislative candidates may adopt a 
policy-seeking strategy or they may emphasize constituency goods. The separate 
survival of the executive and the legislature also has implications. Here, 
presidents “have little to fear from their own colleagues” because they cannot be 
dismissed.55 Thus, Samuels and Shugart state: “to the extent that capture of a 
separately elected presidency is important for control over the distribution of the spoils of 
office and/or the policy process, party behavior and organization will tend to mimic 
constitutional structure, giving rise to ‘presidentialized’ parties” (emphasis in the 
original).56 By contrast, under parliamentarism parties may dismiss their own 
leaders, meaning that potentially leaders have much to fear from their own 
colleagues, meaning that parties remain parliamentarized. Overall, they show 
that variation in separation-of-powers systems, including the direct election of 
the president, has considerable effects on political parties and the political 
process generally. 
 This position has been challenged by Tavits.57 She argues that, by itself, the 
introduction of direct elections does not make a difference to political outcomes. 
To illustrate this argument she takes a sample of European parliamentary 
democracies and semi-presidential democracies with weak presidents. Using the 
share of non-partisan ministers in government as her proxy for presidential 
activism, she shows that there is no significant statistical relationship between 
directly or indirectly elected presidents and the level of presidential activism.58 
More qualitatively, she shows that presidents in some parliamentary systems, 
such as Hungary, have more power than presidents in some semi-presidential 
systems, such as Ireland. Taking the example of Slovakia, she also shows that the 
introduction of direct presidential elections in a parliamentary system does not 
necessarily empower the president. Instead, drawing on the concept of political 
opportunity structures, she states that “constitutional powers are the most 
important aspect of the opportunity structure”, 59  but she argues that the 
incentives for presidential activism will be greater when political consensus is 
low, notably during periods of cohabitation or divided government, and when 
other political institutions are weak, particularly during periods of coalition and 
minority government. This formulation is reminiscent of Duverger’s way of 
thinking about the effect of the relationship between the president and the 
parliamentary majority that was presented 30 years earlier. That said, the fact 
that Tavits questions the idea that direct presidential elections makes a difference 
to political outcomes leads at least one scholar to conclude that her analysis 
challenges the “continued use of the concept” of semi-presidentialism no less.60 
What are we to conclude about the debate over the effect of direct 
presidential elections? First, we can certainly continue to hold the position that 
the direct election of the president makes a taxonomic difference. As we have 
seen, in a post-Duvergerian world the presence or absence of direct presidential 
elections has considerable taxonomic implications, but no necessary empirical 
implications. Those who hold to the post-Duvergerian definition make no claim 
that, by itself, direct election makes any difference to political outcomes. They 
merely claim that it makes a difference to the taxonomic classification of a 
country. For such scholars, when the Czech Republic introduced the direct 
election of the president, it shifted from a parliamentary to a semi-presidential 
regime without implying that it had any implications for empirical outcomes. 
Thus, we can reject the idea that Tavits’ work challenges the very concept of 
semi-presidentialism. This idea is based on a misreading of post-Duvergerian 
scholarship. Second, while taxonomically the matter is clear-cut, whether or not 
the introduction of direct election has an effect of political outcomes still remains 
open to empirical investigation. This is the third-wave equivalent of the two-step 
process that we identified previously. For their part, Samuels and Shugart claim 
that is does make an empirical difference, whereas Tavits argues that it does not. 
Third, even though Samuels and Shugart and Tavits seem poles apart in terms of 
their answer to the question of whether direct presidential elections matter, they 
are not as radically opposed as they might at first appear. For one, Tavits 
compares parliamentary presidents to only a limited subset of premier-
presidential presidents, namely ones with very few constitutional powers. In 
effect, she has deliberately truncated her sample. If she had considered the full 
set of premier-presidential countries, i.e. including those with strong presidents, 
such as France and Romania, then she may have found that direct election was a 
significant predictor of presidential activism. In addition, Samuels and Shugart 
are making a probabilistic rather than a deterministic argument. They can 
perfectly well claim that direct election matters in general, but that it is does not 
always matter. Therefore, they can happily conclude that some parliamentary 
presidents may indeed be stronger than some semi-presidential presidents as 
Tavits shows, without this meaning that in general direct election does not have 
an effect. More importantly, though, even though Samuels and Shugart 
emphasize the empirical importance of the separate origin of the executive and 
the legislature, they focus on more than just the importance of direct election. As 
we have seen, they show there is variation in outcomes between presidentialism 
and president-parliamentarism and, particularly, between these two different 
separation-of-powers regimes and premier-presidentialism, yet all three have 
directly elected presidents. So, direct election alone cannot explain such variation. 
In fact, when they state: “to the extent that capture of a separately elected presidency is 
important for control over the distribution of the spoils of office and/or the policy process, 
party behavior and organization will tend to mimic constitutional structure, giving rise 
to ‘presidentialized’ parties”, we can interpret them as saying that their theory 
applies only to relatively strong presidents.61 Indeed, we might even interpret 
them as saying that when a separately elected presidency is not important, i.e. 
when there are Tavits-style weak presidents, then they do not expect direct 
election to make a difference. Overall, while there is certainly a difference of 
emphasis between Shugart and Carey and Tavits, the debate about the effect of 
direct presidential elections is not as polarized as it might at first appear.  
In this way, we can see how the debate between Shugart and Carey and 
Tavits is at least partly a debate about the effect of presidential power. More 
generally, the impact of variation in presidential power has been a particular 
focus of third-wave studies. This work has been applied both solely to the 
population of semi-presidential democracies and to a broader population of 
semi-presidential and usually parliamentary countries. There are many different 
studies that include semi-presidential countries as part of a large-n analysis. For 
example, Hicken and Stoll show how the size of the presidential prize, i.e. the 
variation in presidential power in presidential and semi-presidential regimes, 
affects the legislative party system in interaction with the sequencing of 
presidential and legislative elections and the effective number of candidates at 
the presidential election.62 Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar show how variation in 
presidential power in semi-presidential systems affects the level of turnout at 
presidential and legislative elections with turnout generally higher at the former 
than the latter above a certain threshold of presidential power.63 While there are 
various individual studies of this sort, there has been a more focused attention on 
the relationship between presidential power and both government formation and 
termination. 
In terms of government formation, Protsyk demonstrates that cabinet 
formation in premier-presidential regimes is “much more predictable” than 
under president-parliamentarism.64 Under premier-presidentialism, the choice of 
prime minister “more consistently reflect[s] the preferences of the parliamentary 
majority”.65 Building on work by Amorim Neto and Strøm, Schleiter and Morgan-
Jones demonstrate that variation in the president’s constitutional power affects 
the outcomes of the cabinet formation process under semi-presidentialism.66 
Preferring to operationalize a more fine-grained measure of presidential power 
than the simple president-parliamentary/premier-presidential dichotomy, they 
show that the greater the president’s power, the more control the president has 
over cabinet composition. Equally, the greater the fragmentation of party groups 
in parliament, the greater the president’s control over formation outcomes. 
However, if the cabinet formation process immediately follows a parliamentary 
election, then the president’s influence is reduced. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 
also compare the outcome of cabinet formation under semi-presidentialism with 
parliamentarism.67 They find that the level of non-partisan ministers is higher 
under the former relative to the latter. They account for the variation in 
ministerial non-partisanship by reference to differences in the powers of 
presidents under semi-presidentialism and to the more complex nature of the 
government formation process under semi-presidentialism due to the president’s 
involvement under this type of regime.  
In terms of government termination, Sedelius and Ekman have used a 
mixture of secondary reports and an expert survey to determine whether there is 
a link between intra-executive conflict in Eastern Europe and cabinet instability.68 
They find that there is an association and that intra-executive conflict is 
particularly destabilizing in president-parliamentary countries relative to 
premier-presidential countries. By contrast, in a comparative study of 
parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes in Europe Schleiter and Morgan-
Jones find no relationship between the type of semi-presidential regime and 
government survival.69 However, they do find that if the president has the power 
to dissolve the legislature then there is a greater likelihood of governments being 
replaced between elections. Contrary to this finding, Cheibub and Chernykh 
show that variation in government stability in semi-presidential and 
parliamentary countries is more affected by the electoral system than by whether 
or not the president is directly elected or by the powers of the president.70 Overall, 
whereas there does seem to be a basic consensus that presidential power matters 
for the process of government formation, the same consensus does not exist in 
relation to government termination. 
Consistent with Duverger’s work in the 1970s, presidential power is not 
the only variable that has been shown to matter. In particular, scholars have 
stressed the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority, 
leading to work about the effect of both cohabitation and minority government 
on presidential outcomes. The standard way of thinking about cohabitation was 
set by Pierce.71 Based on a study of the French case he showed that cohabitation 
reduced the power of the president and increased the level of conflict within the 
executive between the president and the prime minister. More recent third-wave 
studies have built on this work. For example, focusing on semi-presidential 
governments in Eastern Europe Protsyk shows that cohabitation increases the 
level of intra-executive conflict.72 He measures the extent of such conflict by 
counting the examples that were recorded in East European Constitutional Review. 
Using a similar sample of countries but relying on a broader set of sources for the 
data, Sedelius and Mashtaler also find that a higher degree of intra-executive 
conflict under cohabitation than under unified government.73 The results of these 
comparative studies are confirmed and extended in single-country studies. For 
example, in her study of Timor-Leste Beuman finds there was a greater degree of 
conflict between the president and the government under cohabitation.74 In their 
study of Portugal, Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo also find that there is greater 
intra-executive conflict under cohabitation.75 However, contrary to the standard 
wisdom, they also show that cohabitation is associated with an increase in 
presidential power rather than a decline. This is because when there is unified 
government the prime minister is the leader of the parliamentary majority. This 
means that the president’s authority is weaker than the prime minister’s. Under 
cohabitation, though, the president becomes the de facto leader of the majority in 
the executive, giving the president greater legitimacy. The Portuguese case 
neatly illustrates Duverger’s point that it is not only the presence or absence of a 
parliamentary majority that matters, but also the president’s relationship with 
the majority. 
In relation to the effect of minority government on presidential activity, 
the general argument is that presidential activity increases during periods of 
minority government. For example, there is considerable scholarship on the 
situation in Russia in the early and mid-1990s. This was a period of democracy, 
even though, as events have subsequently demonstrated, Russia was hardly a 
consolidated democracy at that time. For that reason, there have been studies of 
Russia during this period from a second-wave perspective.76 All the same, prior to 
the collapse of democracy under President Putin’s United Russia regime, there 
was considerable instability caused by the absence of a cohesive majority in the 
Duma. Various authors have shown how this period was associated with a high 
degree of presidential decree activity77 and with veto activity (Chandler 2001).78 
This finding is consistent with Skach’s work about the perils of divided minority 
government.79 Again, this work is more associated with second-wave studies, but 
it includes a chapter on the early years of the French Fifth Republic when the 
system was democratic and when the president used a variety of constitutional 
powers to deliver his preferred outcomes. From a comparative perspective, 
Protsyk has confirmed this general intuition.80 He has found that presidents were 
more likely to initiate conflict than prime ministers in semi-presidential countries 
in Eastern Europe and that they were more likely to do so when the prime 
minister headed a minority government, suggesting that the presidents sensed 
potential prime ministerial weakness and moved to try to capitalize on the 
situation. By contrast, when there were technocratic cabinets the level of 
presidential/prime ministerial conflict declined. 
To sum up, we can conclude that there is a vibrant third-wave research 
agenda. This work has relied on evidence solely from studies of semi-
presidential countries as well as on evidence from broader cross-national 
comparisons. While there are ongoing debates and controversies, we have seen 
that conclusions drawn from single-country studies, purely semi-presidential 
studies, and broader comparative studies are not necessarily at odds with each 
other. This is a sign that we should continue to engage in all three types of 
studies, so as to arrive at conclusions that are as robust as possible. That said, 
even though there is now a much greater sophistication in analytical techniques 
than before and even though these techniques have been applied to a much 
broader range of issues than was previously the case, scholars often return to the 
variables that Duverger identified some 30 years ago to explain outcomes under 
semi-presidentialism. Thus, while Duverger’s definition of semi-presidentialism 
may now have been overtaken, his insights into the working of semi-presidential 
systems in practice remains current. That said, we should also note that the 
identificationist challenge applies to third wave studies too. Therefore, when 
exploring the effect of variables such as presidential power and the president’s 
relationship with the parliamentary majority, scholars need to conduct their 
analysis in ways that reflect broader methodological developments. This 
challenge is by no means confined to the study of semi-presidentialism, but 
scholars of countries with semi-presidential constitutions need to be aware of it 
and need to be able to respond to it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The systematic study of semi-presidentialism began in the early 1990s. Since this 
time, the focus of the scholarship has changed. We can see a shift from debates 
about the definition of the concept and the classification of countries to 
empirically rich work about the effects of semi-presidentialism on 
democratization and, more recently, a host of other issues too. We can also see 
that there is now a basic two-step process to semi-presidential studies. The first 
step is the taxonomic classification of semi-presidential countries on the basis of a 
post-Duvergerian definition of the term. The second is the identification of 
variation within this set of semi-presidential countries and the empirical 
investigation of the effects of such variation. This two-step process has also 
encouraged different types of empirical investigation. Previously, there was an 
emphasis on single-country case studies. These studies still exist and they have 
their merits, bringing rich empirical detail to the table. However, the idea that the 
effect of semi-presidentialism is not unidirectional and that variation within 
semi-presidential countries has differential effects has encouraged comparative 
scholarship. This is a welcome development because it helps to identify more 
general conclusions about the consequences of semi-presidentialism as well as 
providing the opportunity for broader theoretical developments in comparative 
politics to be applied to the study of semi-presidential countries specifically. 
Thus, students of semi-presidentialism can both draw upon comparative 
scholarship to understand the politics of semi-presidentialism better and 
contribute to comparative scholarship from a better understanding of semi-
presidentialism. 
 There are, though, challenges to the study of semi-presidentialism. Early 
work was quick to draw conclusions about semi-presidentialism on the basis of 
the more or less implicit assumption that semi-presidential countries comprised 
a discrete category separate from presidentialism and parliamentarism. Yet, 
institutional variation within semi-presidentialism clearly shows it does not. 
Therefore, while the concept of semi-presidentialism has considerable taxonomic 
value, it has little empirical validity if it is operationalized as a discrete variable. 
A focus on variation in presidential power is more useful in this regard. For 
some, this shift questions the empirical usefulness of the concept. More generally, 
the interest in institutional analysis that began in the mid-1980s is arguably now 
waning. The study of semi-presidentialism benefited greatly from the fact that 
there was a ready-made theoretical framework with which to study the rise in 
the number of countries with a semi-presidential constitution in the early 1990s. 
As the study of institutions progressed with the development of principal-agent 
approaches and so on, so too did the work on semi-presidentialism and the 
variation within it. Now, though, there have been profound ideational 
developments. When scholars discuss issues such as democratization, there is an 
increasing tendency to adopt a bottom-up analysis that focuses on the impact of 
social actors, new media, and so forth. Scholars of semi-presidentialism need to 
demonstrate the importance of institutional effects relative to these other factors 
if the research of the last 20 years is to remain relevant. Finally, the study of semi-
presidentialism runs the risk of being undermined in the face of the 
identificationist revolution. For example, how will the study of semi-
presidentialism fare in the trend towards a more experimental positivist political 
science? The answer is not immediately apparent, but in order to remain relevant 
semi-presidential scholars have to engage with these broader methodological 
developments. 
 That said, the study of political institutions is unlikely to disappear 
anytime soon. The work of coalition presidentialism in Latin America has the 
potential to be applied more broadly and semi-presidentialism is one obvious 
area of interest. In this regard, the work on the presidential toolkit has the 
potential for a much broader application and would suit the study of semi-
presidential countries very well. 81  The ongoing work on comparative 
constitutions challenges certain received ideas about semi-presidentialism, but 
also provides the opportunity for debate as well as new data-led studies.82 In turn, 
the study of semi-presidentialism has much to offer to the work about the 
presidentialization and/or personalization of parliamentary systems. Overall, 
while we can now identify three waves of semi-presidential studies after 20 years 
of scholarship, we can also look forward to more work and new waves of 
scholarship in the years to come. 
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